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AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 
 
Caroline Ker, Researcher at the CRID1
 
 
Intellectual property has spread through agricultural sector influencing the 
characteristics of downward food sector. According to the industry, patents are a condition for 
conducting R&D in biotechnologies.  
 
Since 1995, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(“TRIPs”) imposes WTO Member States minimal levels of intellectual property protection. It 
embraces all type of intellectual property rights and concerns many subject-matters of 
different kinds considered for the occasion as merchant commodities: book, film, music, 
software, clothing, as well as plant, DNA, chemistry, etc. In addition, for these minimal 
protection standards to be effective, the TRIPs Agreement requires member states to adopt 
enforcement measures for the rights-holders to fight against infringement. The standardization 
effect of those minimal intellectual property standards is reinforced by the national-treatment 
and the most-favoured-nation clauses, key provisions in the process of standardization of 
intellectual property.  
 
As the forum for the conclusion of such Agreement, the WTO was favoured by 
developed countries and their industries over the World Intellectual Property Organisation of 
the United Nations (“WIPO”). For the developing countries, the perspective of access to the 
other WTO members markets was an effective incentive to accept the IP standards of the 
developed countries. The WTO was also favoured because of its dispute settlement 
mechanism. Moreover, the possibilities of trade retortion measures it offers are an effective 
sanction mechanism in case of non compliance with its international commitments.  As a 
matter of fact, the standardization established by the TRIPs constitutes a key instrument for 
securing the exploitation of their IPR by industries of the developed countries. It is of 
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common sense that the IPR-industry (chemical industry, biotech-industry, agro-industry, as 
well as entertainment and copyright industries) is mostly established in developed countries. 
 
Although Intellectual property is necessary to allow the recoupment of the investment 
in R&D, the exclusive control it guarantees to the right-holder on a given agricultural resource 
might in certain cases conflict with other social or economic goals such as sustainable access 
to food.  The TRIPs Agreement limits therefore the autonomy of the countries to decide to 
establish an intellectual property system or to accommodate such system to social and 
political concerns. Nevertheless, it must be noted that it comes out of Article 7 of the 
Agreement that the objective of the protection of intellectual property rights was considered to 
contribute to social and economic welfare2. In addition, article 8 seem to consider favourably 
the adoption by member states of measures necessary to protect public health and 
nutrition…provided however that such measures are consistent with the treaty (Article 8)3. 
1. The mandatory patent subject-matter  
The most relevant intellectual property rights as to agricultural resources are the patent 
right and the plant variety protection system (PVP)4. Article 27 § 1 of TRIPs commands 
member states to make patent available “ for any inventions, whether products or processes, 
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application”. Patent shall be available “without discrimination as to the 
place of invention and whether products are imported or locally produced”. Therefore, 
member states are not allowed to exclude the life-science field, nor agricultural or food fields 
from patentability. 
 
A patent gives the right-holder many “exclusive rights”. The holder of the patent has 
the exclusive right of making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes, 
                                                 
2 Article 7 : “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and 
to a balance of rights and obligations”. 
3 For further reflection on Article 8 as a basis to limit patentability, see the contribution of M. BLAKENEY: 
“Compulsory licensing and food security”, see also G. VAN OVERWALLE: “Patents in Agricultural 
Biotechnology and the Right to Food” and H. MORTEN HAUGEN: “Research Exemptions in Patent and Plant 
Variety Legislation”. 
4 The TRIPs Agreement also establishes minimal level of Trademark and Geographical indications protections. 
Although less significant for the purpose of the present report, those protection systems are also likely to have 
consequences on the food system. 
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the patented product/process or to allow others to do so.  In the hypothesis of a plant-related 
product patent, the exclusive right may extend to the products composed of such plant and 
parts of plants5. 
2. Exemptions to the mandatory patent subject-
matter 
Article 27 states exceptions to the mandatory patentability of innovations. WTO 
members are allowed to exclude plants and essentially biological processes for the production 
of plant from patentability. Micro-organisms and microbiological processes must however be 
patentable. As to the plant varieties, article 27 leaves to members states the choice of the 
protection system to apply. Those dispositions are detailed further in this contribution.  
 
It must be noted beforehand that TRIPs does not define any of those terms (plant, 
essentially biological process, micro-organisms, plant varieties) although they circumscribe 
the scope of the international commitments of member states as to patentability. Those terms 
draw the line between what is mandatorily patentable and what is not according to TRIPs. 
There is no scientific consensus as to definitions of those terms to refer to either. This absence 
of mandatory definition gives member states a breathing space when designing their national 
patent subject-matter6. Clarifications may however come out of the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement System, in the hypothesis of a complaint of a member as to the compliance of 
another member regulation to the TRIPs requirements.  
                                                 
5 Concerning the application of that principle to a patent related to a DNA sequence and its important 
implications on the downstream food chain, see in the present report the contribution of V. CASSIERS et B. 
REMICHE: “Biotechnology Patent Use and Right to Food”. 
6 In the E.U., some of those terms have been specified by the European Patent Office (EPO) and the European 
Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (Article 53 of the European Patent 
Convention is almost identical to Article 27 of the TRIPs, this latter being drafted on the former’s model). 
However, such interpretation by the EPO should not influence the interpretation of Article 27.3 (b) TRIPS. The 
political and economic inspirations that have determined the case-law of the EPO and the content of the 
European Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions shall not influence the delimitation of 
WTO’s member states international commitments concerning patentability (beside it is worth noting that the 
EPO case-law has lead to a gradual expansion of the scope of patentability under the EPC, notably to stick to the 
U.S. scope for competitiveness reasons). 
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2.1 Plants and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants 
Plants 
 
Article 27.3 (b) exempts states from making patent available for plant. Such provision 
may be useful for the agricultural sector. Member states may not protect plant and its parts, or 
they may tailor a protection system at their discretion. According to the consultation 
undertaken by the Council for TRIPs7, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Thailand exclude plant from patentability8 . Other member 
states which have answered the TRIPs Council survey generally admit the patentability of 
plants. 
 
In several of the member states admitting the protection of plant9, an adaptation of the 
conditions for patentability has been made (by means of a modification of the regulatory 
framework or as a consequence of the patent offices practice), in order to adapt them to the 
living material. Since patent regimes have been crafted to protect technical inventions, it 
makes it inappropriate to admit the patentability of biological material that occurs in nature 
but which was “revealed” by biotechnologies, as it appear to constitute merely discovered and 
not invented by human10. For instance the identification of a plant-related gene does not 
easily meet the patentability conditions of novelty, inventive step and industrial application, 
nor does it constitute an invention, exclusive subject-matter of patent-right. To bypass this 
obstacle, some states allow for patentability of biological material that has been “isolated” or 
“purified” from its natural environment11. To be adapted to biotechnologies, biological 
                                                 
7 Most of the information on the national implementations of Article 27.3(b) has been taken out of the 
consultation undertaken by the Council for TRIPs of the WTO, which outcome has been summarized in the 
WTO document IP/C/W/273/Rev.1 of 18 February 2003.  Information has been received from the following 
states:  Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and their member States, 
Hungary, Japan, Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Switzerland, the United States and Zambia. Information was also found in M. TEMMERMAN: “The 
Patentibility of Plant GeneticIinventions”, available on 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1069948 
8 The lists of states contained in this contribution are illustrative and might not be exhaustive. 
9 U.S., E.U., Japan, Australia, Romania, Switzerland 
10 Traditionally, discoveries are excluded from the patent scope. Such exemption arises from a traditional 
conception according to which what occurs as such in the nature and is as such exempt from significant human 
intervention is not relevant for patentability which ambition is to protect the outcome of human inventiveness. 
11 E.g. Australia, E.U., U.S. 
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material produced by means of a technical process was also made patentable although 
previously occurring in nature 12.  
In order not to be considered as mere discoveries, it is however required that an industrial 
application be demonstrated13, or new or unexpected properties be exhibited14, or the patent 
must not be claimed for biological material “either in the natural state, or does not encompass 
the plant found in its natural state”15. In other states, a “creative effort” is required16 or the 
process used for the isolation must be new17. However, it is worth noting that such adaptation 
of the patent scope and/or conditions is not required by the TRIPs Agreement itself. 
 
 Essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
 
The TRIPS Agreement allows for the non patentability of essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants as well. The E.U., Canada, Korea, Thailand and South 
Africa have exercised such option and exclude essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants from patentibility. But TRIPs does not specify the line between what is to 
be considered as essentially biological (and not mandatorily patentable) and what is non-
essentially biological, and therefore mandatory patent subject-matter. Therefore, here also 
member states who choose not to patent essentially biological processes benefit from an 
additional margin in the designing of their patent subject-matter through the definition of 
those later.   
 
Exemption to the exemption: the mandatory patentability of micro-organisms and 
microbiological processes 
 
In spite of the exclusion of plant and essentially biological processes from 
patentability, the TRIPs Agreement makes the patentability of micro-organisms and 
microbiological processes mandatory. Here also, although the definition of “micro-organism” 
and “microbiological processes” participate to the definition of the mandatory subject-matter, 
they are not defined by the TRIPs and there is no unanimous scientific definition either. If 
biological material is qualified as micro-organism instead of plant or part of a plant, it is 
                                                 
12 Article 23 (c)(a) EPC and Article 3(2) on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. 
13 E.U.  
14 U.S. 




mandatorily patentable. Such absence of definition also provides states with additional margin 
in the implementation of the Agreement for those states that have excluded plants from their 
patent scope. For example, Brazil which excludes plant from patentability considers that it 
extends to parts of plant, except micro-organisms. In Thailand also, extracts of plant are not 
patentable in virtue of the plant exception. On the contrary, US and European patent offices 
have gradually qualified more types of material as micro-organisms. According to EPO, this 
category includes “not only bacteria and yeasts, but also fungi, algae, protozoa and human, 
animal and plant cells, i.e. all generally unicellular organisms with dimensions beneath the 
limits of vision which can be propagated and manipulated in a laboratory…Plasmids and 
viruses are also considered to fall under this definition”18 and therefore eligible for patent 
protection as micro-organisms. In Brazil, some of those objects may be qualified as part of 
plant and therefore escape from the patentability scope. 
2.2. Plant varieties: choice of the means of protection 
Plant varieties are not mandatory patent subject-matter. However, member states must 
provide for a plant variety protection system (PVP), be the patent right, or an effective sui 
generis protection, or a combination thereof. The TRIPs does not impose any given sui 
generis protection system to be adopted by member states, not even the most well-known 
UPOV Breeder’s Right (see below). TRIPs therefore allows member states to tailor a plant 
varieties protection system that balances the interest of the breeders with alternate social 
constraints, such as the right to food, the interest of the farmers or the protection of 
biodiversity. The condition however is that such system is effective. The Agreement does not 
give more details as to what is supposed to be an effective protection system.  
 
The mandatory protection of plant varieties contrasts with the exemption applicable to 
plants. The definition of “variety” that member states will consequently adopt influences their 
plant intellectual property system. In states which have excluded plants from patentability, the 
definition of “variety” will determine what under the scope of intellectual property. In states 
where plants are patentable and variety are protected by a sui generis protection system, the 
definition of variety will determine the line between the patent right and the sui generis 
system.  
 
                                                 
18 Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office, Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic System , Case 
T/0356/93, 21 february 1995, § 34, available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t930356ex1.pdf 
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  Most of the WTO members which have implemented the Agreement exclusively 
protect plant varieties with a sui generis protection system. Exceptions to this common trend 
are the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and the U.K. which make patent 
available to plant varieties. In the U.S. and Australia, a patent protection is also available to 
plant varieties leaving the door open for double protection.  
 
In spite of the discretion left to member states as to the design of a plant variety 
protection system of their own, one must admit that most members have chosen the UPOV 
protection system. Out of the 153 WTO members, around 70 are UPOV members. One reason 
is that many developed countries had already implemented the UPOV’s Breeder’s Right in 
their legislation before the TRIPs Agreement was concluded (see below). Other reason 
explaining the choice of the UPOV protection system by developing countries is the 
promotion of UPOV undertaken by OECD countries in their bilateral trade agreements with 
the former19. Few States have adopted an alternative (to UPOV) sui generis plant protection 
system: India20, Thailand, Zambia and the African countries which have adopted the model 
drafted by the Organization of African Unity (Kenya, South Africa, Namibia)21.  The U.S. has 
enacted its proper plant variety protection system (it has two different plant variety protection 
systems indeed). Amongst those alternative sui generis systems to UPOV, some are similar to 
this latter where others develop a significantly different approach (India and the African 
model). 
As a conclusion, it can be stated that, generally speaking, most of the members that 
have implemented the Agreement have chosen to protect plant varieties with the UPOV 
breeder’s right and do not allow for plant variety patent with the notable exception of the U.S. 
and Australia.   
 
As to the possible cumulation of intellectual property rights on varieties, the following 
reflection must however be made. Even in states where varieties are excluded from the patent 
scope and may exclusively be protected by a sui generis right, one or several patents may 
overlap with such sui generis protection. It is common that the use and the research on a 
variety imply one or several patents in addition to the breeders right.  The reason is that plants 
                                                 
19See in the present report the contribution of J.F. MORIN : “Intellectual Property in Agriculture and Bilateral 
Agreements” 
20 See the contribution of S.K. VERMA : “The TRIPs Flexibility Mechanisms and Right to Food” 
21 See the contribution of T. SANOU : “The alternative sui generis regimes as defended by the African group 
within the WTO: which protective system for the plant varieties?” 
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are at a higher taxonomy rank than varieties. As a consequence, such varieties may be 
concerned by plant patent(s) that are applicable to the plant of which they are a variety. 
Another reason is that many breeders succeed in patenting varieties thanks to the wording of 
their patent claim in spite of the non patentability of plant varieties. The practice of patent 
offices is also determining. In E.U. for instance, the European Patent Office admits the 
patentability of inventions that might embrace plant varieties, as long as such plant varieties 
are not individually claimed22.  
 
As it constitutes the major trend amongst WTO members which have adopted a sui 





The breeding activity got to a mature point much before biotechnologies, and from the 
early past century, need for protection was already expressed by the (developed countries’) 
breeders’ industry. For several reasons, patent protection was however considered inadequate. 
One important reason was linked to the evolving nature of living material that plants are. 
Given such evolving nature of plants, it was acknowledged that access to the breeding 
material of existent varieties had to be preserved for the development of new varieties by 
breeders in spite of intellectual property protection. An alternative protection system was 
tailored in the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties, concluded in 
1961, better known as the UPOV Convention. When the TRIPS Agreement was concluded in 
1994, many States were already members of the UPOV and had integrated the Breeder’s 
Right into their legislation. Patentability was thus not made mandatory for varieties and the 
choice of an effective sui generis protection system was left to member states. The adoption of 
the UPOV Breeder’s Right is considered to comply with the provision of the TRIPs as to the 
protection of plant varieties23 (it is also the most unanimous) although other sui generis 
systems may be chosen.  
The original Act of the UPOV (1961) has been modified several times, the 
modifications tending to strengthen the Breeder’s Right, making it closer to a patent system.  
                                                 
22 Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO, Transgenic Plant/ Novartis II, 20 December 1999. 
23 Other sui generis protection systems are likely to satisfy to the prescription of the TRIPs concerning the 
protection of plant varieties.  
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The last version is the 1991 Act which all member states have not ratified. Consequently, the 
Breeder’s Right does not have the same content in all UPOV members, some still applying 
the 1978 version.  
 
The UPOV Breeder’s Right establishes a legal protection for created or discovered 
plant varieties, defined as “a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest 
known rank”24, which notably presents characteristics that distinguish it from other plant 
groupings. Created or discovered varieties that meet the requirements of novelty, 
distinctiveness, stability and uniformity are eligible for protection. An authorization of the 
breeder of a protected variety is necessary not only for the commercialisation of the 
propagating material of the variety (eg. seeds, cuttings), but for its production as well25. 
However thanks to an exception, the Breeder’s Right does not extend to acts done privately 
and for non-commercial purposes26. The harvested material is not concerned by the exclusive 
right unless it has been obtained through the unauthorized use of propagating material27.   
 
The UPOV Breeder’s Right has been conceived more narrowly than the patent right. 
The Breeder’s Right scope is limited to the propagating material and does not extend to 
harvested material28 of a defined variety and concerns the variety per se and not products that 
are derived from the variety. It is also characterized by exemptions proper to the evolving 
nature of plants (the breeder’s exemption) and is balanced according social and economic 
goals that may conflict with the right-holders interests (the farmer’s privilege).  
As stated above, the breeder’s exemption constitutes one of the raison d’être of the 
Breeder’s Right. The UPOV Convention recognizes the right for breeders to use protected 
varieties without the consent of the right-holder, in order to develop and commercialize a new 
variety. Although patent right may provide for research exemption, it is of limited extent and 
certainly does not cover the commercialization of the resulting goods29.  
The farmers’ privilege arises from a traditional practice of the farmers of sowing and 
exchanging propagating material taken out of their harvest. The contribution of this practice 
to the development of biodiversity is acknowledged and prohibiting it would make the cost of 
                                                 
24 Article 1 UPOV 1991 
25 Article 14 (1) UPOV 1991 
26 Article 15 (1) UPOV 1991 
27 Article 14 (1) UPOV 1991 
28 Unless it has been obtained through unauthorized use of propagating material 
29 On the compliance of the research exemption to the TRIPs Agreement, see the contribution of H. MORTEN 
HAUGEN: “Research Exemptions in Patent and Plant Variety Legislation”. 
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inputs heavier for farmers30. It was partially preserved in the early versions of the UPOV 
Breeder’s Right, as the authorization was not needed for farmer to reuse and exchange seeds. 
The 1991 version submits however the Farmers’ Privilege to the adoption of an express 
exception by the member states. In the absence of such legal exception, farmers are not 
allowed to do so without the consent of the breeders.  
The following countries have enacted a farmer’s privilege in their plant variety 
protection system : Australia, Bulgaria (certain species only), Czech Republic (for certain 
crops only and a remuneration is due except for small farmers), Switzerland, European Union 
(for certain agricultural crops only and a remuneration is due except for small farmers), 
Estonia (a remuneration is due except for small farmers), Honk Kong (for certain varieties 
only), Japan (except as otherwise prescribed by contract), Lithuania (a remuneration is due 
except for small farmers) , Morocco, Thailand, US (only as to varieties protected by the Plant 
Variety Protection Act and for re-sowing only; no farmer’s privilege  if case of protection by 
Utility Patent Act or Plant Patent Act), Slovenia (a suitable remuneration to be paid, except 
small farmers). Such exemption is uncommon in Patent Right although some States have 
adopted it (the E.U. legislation has enacted such exemption to plant-related patent although an 
equitable remuneration is due to the right-holders, except for small farmers). The trend among 
breeders to deprive farmer from enjoying the farmers’ privilege, by contractual or technical 
means, has been noted31. 
Next to the farmers’ privilege and the breeder’s right, it is worth noting the enactment 
by some national lawmakers of a compulsory license mechanism to the breeder’s right. This 
aims at ensuring reasonable public access to the plant variety, in cases of absence of 
exploitation of the variety, insufficient offering for sale, or if access is not possible at 
reasonable prices (Australia, Hong Kong, Lithuania, Morocco, New Zealand, Thailand). Such 
flexibilities contrast with the strict rules that condition the adoption of compulsory licences to 
patent right according to TRIPs and the Paris Convention32. 
 
As a conclusion, the UPOV Convention appears much appropriate to satisfy the 
objective of balancing intellectual property with a sustainable realization of the right to food 
when compared to patent protection. The above-mentioned limitations to the Breeder’s Right, 
                                                 
30 See S.K. VERMA : “Right to Food and Intellectual Property Rights”. 
31 Concerning technical and contractual limitations of the exceptions, see the contribution of  D. BURK: 
“Contractual and Technical Restrictions of Patent Limitations” and S.K. VERMA : “Right to Food and 
Intellectual Property Rights: Farmers’ Rights”. 
32 See the contribution of M. BLAKENEY: “Compulsory Licensing and Food Security” 
 10
along with a narrower scope of protection, suggest such analysis. However, this must not 
conceal that the UPOV Convention has been conceived as an answer to the economic needs of 
the breeding industry from the North. This explains that the UPOV Convention, if appropriate 
to the business model of the latter, might remain unsatisfactory for the developing countries’ 
agricultural activity and nutrition objectives. The substantial differences that distinguish the 
UPOV Convention with the sui generis PVP systems that were conceived in India and 
Africa33  illustrate such assertion.  
3. Flexibility possibilities 
Along with the possible exemptions of plant, essentially biological processes and 
varieties from the scope of patent right, the TRIPs Agreement contains some other 
possibilities to customize the patent protection in order to balance it with conflicting social 
and economic goals such as the right to food. Those possibilities are just mentioned here as 
most of them will be further discussed in the present report.   
3.1. Ordre public and morality, the protection of plant life and 
environment 
The second paragraph of article 27 allows for exclusion from patentability34 to protect 
“ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to 
avoid serious prejudice to the environment” . Experts are quite unanimous in favour of a 
narrow interpretation of this paragraph which would not allow states to exclude entire fields 
from patentability (such as biotech-agricultural or pharmaceutical products) but may only 
justify exclusions on a case-by-case basis35. 
                                                 
33 See the contribution of S.K.VERMA: “The TRIPs Flexibility Mechanisms and Right to Food” and the 
contribution of T.  SANOU: “The alternative sui generis regimes as defended by the African group within the 
WTO: which protective system for the plant varieties?” 
34“ Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial 
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made 
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law”. 
35 Dutfield (2004) citing Moufang (1998) 
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3.2. Exceptions and limitations 
Article 30 provides members with the possibilities to establish limited exceptions to 
patent right provided that they do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.  Because of such conditions, the adoption 
of exception may be a limited tool to address food needs.  
3.3. Compulsory licences 
Article 31 allows for the adoption of compulsory licenses. However submitted to tight 
constraints, the compulsory licences option may in certain hypothesis offer a helpful means to 
accommodate the interest of the right-holders with nutrition needs in the context of the food 
crisis36.  
4. Conclusion 
Although it establishes mandatory minimal standards of intellectual property 
protection, the TRIPs Agreement offers some limited breathing spaces for WTO members to 
craft their patent domain in accordance with social or economic conflicting needs. The 
possibility that states have to exclude plants and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants from patentability is probably the most useful margin for them to address 
nutrition concerns. However member states have not taken much profit of this possibility nor 
of the discretion left to them to craft a sui generis protection variety system. The causes may 
be found on political or economic grounds. 
The flexibilities given by the TRIPs must not conceal however that the globalization 
of intellectual property that the TRIPs Agreement conveys a major step in the extension of the 
North’s set of social rules to the South. Before TRIPs, the extension on intellectual property to 
the living domain was rare. In addition, the integration of intellectual property among the 
concerns that require the care of the state, possibly placing it in conflict with other public 
concerns such as the right to food, is far from being trivial. In spite of the flexibilities granted 
by the Agreement, WTO member states have certainly lost means to address such public 
concerns. Interpreting the TRIPs (as many of its provisions are subject to interpretation) with 
                                                 
36 See in the present report the contributions of M. BLAKENEY: “Compulsory Licensing and Food Security” 
and H. MORTEN HAUGEN: “Research exemptions in patent and plant variety legislation”. 
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the criteria of preserving the public means to address policy concerns such as the right to 
sustainable food should therefore be recommended. Such interpretative compass is provided 
by Article 737 and 838, respectively titled “Objectives” and “Principles”.  
                                                 
37 Article 7 TRIPs : « The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” 
38 Article 8.1 TRIPs : « Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance 
to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement”. 
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